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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
A. FRED FLEMING, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
FLEMING FELT COMPANY, a cor-
poration, and JOSEPH H. FELT and 
MARIE FELT, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case 
No. 8732 
Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent is unable to agree with the Statement of Facts 
as set forth in appellants' brief, and under the recent Utah 
Supreme Court decision of Douglas vs. Duvall, 304 P2d, elects 
to restate the facts in a manner consistent with the true nature 
of the controversy. 
Plaintiff was operating an automotive supply business 
3 
.,.:-, -----
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known as the A. Fred Fleming Supply in Provo, Utah, ~nd had 
been engaged in that business since 1949 (R. 57, Exn. 1-P). 
In the middle of July, 1953, J. H. Felt contacted A. Fred Flem-
ing and offered to sell him his business in Salt Lake City, 
known as the J. H. Felt Motor Supply Company, a Utah cor-
poration, (R. 56). 
In substance, Mr. Felt told Fleming that his business could 
be bought for $17,000.00 or $18,000.00; that he wanted to 
retire and travel with his wife, Marie Felt, and he wanted 
someone to manage it and take it over. If Mr. Fleming would 
put his merchandise in with the J. H. Felt Motor Supply 
Company, Fleming could pay him $200.00 a month for Mr. 
Felt's stock (R. 57, 58). 
The week following the first contact in Provo, Fleming 
came to Salt Lake City and looked over the merchandise of 
the J. H. Felt Motor Supply Company and observed that much 
of the merchandise was old and obsolete. Fleming called this 
to the attention of Mr. Felt, who assured Fleming that he would 
be charged only for merchandise that was actually good and 
he would not be charged anything for good will (R. 60). 
Fleming, after thinking over the proposition made by Mr. 
Felt, moved his merchandise and business, valued at $13,511.52, 
from Provo to Salt Lake City, on September 1, 1953. At that 
time, Fleming commenced doing business with the Felts jointly, 
and Fleming received 13,512 shares of stock in the new cor-
poration known as the Fleming-Felt Company (R. 62). The 
Felts received 25,234 shares of stock in the new corporation, 
with J. H. Felt as president and Marie Felt as secretary-
treasurer (Exh. 1-P). 
4. 
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L<J.wrence McKay, at the suggestion of Mr. Felt, was to 
draft a11 agre':!ment covering the sale. A written agreement was 
submitted to Fleming six weeks after he had moved to Salt 
Lake City, but it was not drafted according to the terms dis-
cussed between Fleming and Mr. Felt (R. 61, 62). Fleming, 
who was not represented by an attorney, objected to the price 
set forth in the contract, the forfeiture provision and condi-
tions under which his office as general manager could be ter-
minated (R. 61). 
Fleming also objected to the second and third drafts of 
the contract and finally signed the agreement after becoming 
so involved from operating together nearly three months (R. 
58, 105). At the time this contract was signed, Mr. Felt made 
the representation that Fleming was not charged for obsolete 
merchandise; that Mr. Felt's position as president of the new 
Fleming-Felt Company was just an honorary position; that 
Fleming would be the general manager and have the full 
management of business (R. 59) ; that the forfeiture provi-
sions were legal terms that had to be in the contract and no 
court would enforce such a provision (R. 61), and upon the 
further representation by Mrs. Felt that she was not in the 
business because she wanted to be and that she was certainly 
going to retire when Mr. Felt retired (R. 67). Fleming, relying 
upon these representations (R. 63, 66), signed the contract. 
He did not see a copy of the complete inventory, Exh. 4-P, 
with prices of the J. H. Felt Motor Supply Company until 
February 11, 1955 (R. 62, 76) and had previously accepted 
it in good faith. 
Eight or nine months later when Fleming had become 
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acquainted with the business, he proposed a change in the book-
keeping system in order to obtain a financial statement more 
often than once a year. As secretary and treasurer, Mrs. Felt 
as well as Mr. Felt, objected to a change in the bookkeeping 
system and refused to make any material change (R. 67, 68). 
Mr. Felt was in charge of delivery service, which was very 
poor, and Fleming requested that this service be improved 
and Mr. Felt objected to, and refused to make, any change 
in the delivery service (R. 69). Fleming proposed that much 
of the merchandise of the company, which was not being sold, 
be reduced in price in order to move it and provide operating 
capital to obtain new stock. Mr. Felt told him that "If a person 
wants to buy that, they will pay full price for it" (R. 69). 
The Felts also refused to initiate Fleming's policy of giving 
a 2% discount on bills paid before the lOth of each month 
(R. 171, 172). 
After these changes had been proposed, the Felts invited 
Mr. and Mrs. Fleming to their home for dinner in January of 
1955. When the table was cleared Mr. Felt produced a financial 
statement which he had prepared without taking an inventory 
of the merchandise and said, "We are losing monef.:' (R. 70). 
When Fleming didn't accept the report, Mr. ~1!wieg took a 
resolution from his pocket and announced that this was a 
Board of Directors meeting and read the resolution which 
stated as follows: "Be it resolved that Fred Fleming, being 
a good salesman, shall be sales manager and shall buy as he 
i~ presently doing; that Marie Felt be financial manager and 
that he, Joseph Felt, would run the store" (R. 71). 
Shortly after the above meeting, Fleming posted a notice 
6 
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in the office of the company outlining the duties of the general 
manager prepared by an attorney, Mr. Ralph (R. 122). After 
it was there for a few days Mr. Felt ripped it down (R. 71), 
and Fleming told Mr. Felt at this time that things were so 
unbearable that one of them would have to leave the business. 
Fleming offered to leave upon the condition that he receive his 
merchandise from the company. Felt, however, decided to go. 
The next morning Fleming fired Mrs. Felt for incompetency 
(R. 73, 74), and she requested that she be permitted to work 
until about the first part of March, 1955 (R. 74). 
On May 23, 195 5, the Board of Directors of the Fleming-
Felt Company, composed of Joseph H. Felt, Harold B. Felt, 
A. Fred Fleming, LaFaun J. Fleming and Marie Felt, with the 
Flemings voting in the negative, passed a motion rehiring 
Marie Felt at a salary of $400.00 per month, after a competent 
bookkeeper had been hired by Fleming at $200.00 per month 
(R. 74, 75, Exh. 15-D, Page 9). Fleming's authority to sign 
checks was also restricted by the Board of Directors at this 
May 23rd meeting (Exh. 15-D). 
The Board of Directors on May 23, 1955, with the Flem-
ings voting in the negative, also passed by-laws which gave the 
general control and charge of the affairs of the Fleming-Felt 
Corporation to the president of the company, J. H. Felt (R. 
71, Exh. P-2, Art. III, Paragraph 2), contrary to the contract. 
On June 1, 1955, Fleming mailed a check to the Felts for 
$200.00 to apply on the purchase of the Felts' stock in the 
Fleming-Felt Company. The check was returned with no ex-
planation and on June 8, 1955, Fleming tendered $200.00 in 
cash to the Felts which they refused to accept (R. 75, 109, 184). 
7 
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Being unable to operate as general manager, Fleming left the 
business (R. 75, 76) and tendered back the 13,512 shares of 
stock in the Fleming-Felt Company endorsed in blank and 
requested a rescission of the contract and a return of $13,512.00 
or stock of that value on July 26, 1955 (R. 107, 129, 130). Also, 
on July 26, 1955, Fleming offered to return the certificates, 
owned by Joseph H. Felt and Marie Felt, which he held (R. 
130, 185). 
From the latter part of February, 1955 (R. 78, 79), until 
July 26, 1955, negotiations for settlement of the dispute were 
attempted (R. 76, 79, 80, 110, Exh. 15-D, Page 8). Fleming 
offered Felt $5,000.00 payment to apply on the purchase of the 
business after June 8, 1955, and before suit was filed (R. 109) 
and it was refused. 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
: ~ -
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RESCINDED THE l.,~ ,::= 
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES HERETO AS BE- ·-
lNG INEQUITABLE AND ILLEGAL AND DID NOT 
XIU 
MISCONSTRUE THE SAME IN ANY MATERIAL ASPECT. 
II. THE FINDING OF FACT NO.8 IS REASONABLY 
SUSTAINED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
III. FLEMING WAS NOT BARRED ON THE 
GROUNDS OF LACHES, WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL FROM 
SEEKING A RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT. 
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT NOS. 7 AND 11 ARE REA-
SONABLY SUSTAINED BY THE EVIDENCE AND LEND 
SUPPORT TO THE JUDGMENT OF RESCISSION. 
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V. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING A 
MONEY JUDGMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RESCINDED THE 
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES HERETO AS BE-
ING INEQUITABLE AND ILLEGAL AND DID NOT 
MISCONSTRUE THE SAME IN ANY MATERIAL ASPECT. 
The defendants ask in their brief wherein the contract is 
illegal. It is well established law that a contract founded in 
fraud is illegal, as stated in the case of Goodrich vs. Tenney, 
144 Ill. 422, 33 N.E. 44, as follows: 
"Contracts are illegal when founded upon a con-
sideration contra bones mores, against the principals 
of sound public policy, in fraud or in contravention of 
the provision of some statute." 
A contract which is invalid, as set forth in Black's Law 
Dictionary, page 1005, is: 
"Vain; inadequate to its purpose; not of binding 
force or legal efficacy; lacking in authority or obliga-
tion." 
The following authorities are to the same effect: 
State vs. American Surety Company (Idaho), 145 P. 1097 
at Page 1104: 
"The word illegal means unlawfully and contrary 
to law." 
Bretz vs. El Reno State Bank (Okla.) 177 P. 362: 
9 
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''The term 'illegal' in its common acceptation signifies 
t?at which is contrary to the principals of law as dis-
tinguished from Rules of Procedure." 
"Any agreement to wrong or defraud a third person 
or an agreement which involves a fraud on the rights 
of oth~rs .or which has an obvious tendency to encourage 
fraud 1s 1llegal because it is contrary to public policy." 
12 Am. Jur., page 677, Section 178. 
"There is no principal in the law better settled than 
th~t whate~er has an obviou~ te~dency to encourage 
guilty neghgence, fraud or crune 1s contrary to public 
policy." Maxwell Operating Co. vs. Harper, L.R.A. 
1918C, Page 673. 
Contrary to statements in defendants' brief (Page 6) 
plaintiff alleged false and fraudulent representations that in-
duced him to enter into the contract (R. 3, 4, 5) and such was 
argued at the trial of this matter and considered by the court 
in making its decision. 
The court, in characterizing the contract as unilateral and 
inequitable, obviously was concerned about its one-sided nature; 
unilateral being so defined by Black's Law Dictionary, Page 
1781. This meaning is also evident from the Conclusion of 
Law No. 1, which states: "That the contract between the Felts 
and Fleming is unilateral, inequitable and unenforceable by 
Fleming against the Felts, but grants the Felts complete power 
to dominate and terminate the contract as against Fleming" (R. 
273). 
Close examination and analysis of the contract and the 
evidence shows the court was completely justified in its con-
clusion that the contract was founded in fraud, one-sided, 
inequitable and illegal. 
10 
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Fleming was to receive the right to be general manager. 
However, the Board of Directors of the Fleming-Felt Com-
pany would always be under the control of the Felts as majority 
stockholders (Exh. 1-P, R. 64), and the Felts used their power 
on the Board of Directors to limit plaintiff's authority to that 
of a mere salesman for the Company. This is evident by action 
taken at the Board of Directors meeting on May 23, 1955, 
rehiring Marie Felt at $400.00 per month, after she had been 
discharged by Mr. Fleming (Exh. 15-D Page 9). 
The power, control and intent of the Felts were also mani-
fested at the so-called Board of Directors meeting in January, 
1955, when Fleming was discharged for no valid reason as 
"general manager" and given the duties of "sales manager" 
(R. 70, 71). 
The contract contained a provision whereby if Fleming 
failed to make a profit for any two consecutive years he could 
be discharged as general manager. In opposing Mr. Fleming as 
general manager it is obvious that the Felts were anxious to 
have him breach that provision of the contract, which by their 
power and control they could accomplish, thereby giving them 
the right to terminate his duties as general manager. There is 
no question but what the Felts had complete power to dominate 
and terminate the contract as against Fleming. 
By the procedure of Marie Felt making checks out for bills 
of the company before they were to be paid (Exh. 15-P Page 5) 
and Mr. Felt estimating the inventory (R. 131, 70) they at-
tempted to convince Fleming by financial statements, based 
upon that procedure that he was not making a profit in the 
business, as required under the contract. The dinner meeting 
11 
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in January, 1955 (R. 70) and the meeting April 1, 1955, were 
called for that very purpose (Exh. 15-D Page 5). 
Fleming was to receive the right to purchase the shares 
of stock owned by the Felts; yet, under the contract, the Felts 
were to receive for their services, and did receive, the same 
amount of money per month as Fleming was paid, so long as 
the Felts were hired by the company, which the Felts could 
insist upon, and did insist upon, through the Board of Directors 
which they controlled (Exh. 15-D Page 9}. When neither 
of the Felts was hired by the company, Fleming was obligated, 
whether he was still general manager or not, to proceed with 
the purchase of the stock, and until the sales price of $33,269.00 
with interest was paid in full, legal title to the stock remained 
with the Felts and they would receive all the dividends, have 
all the voting privileges and right that could exist in or by the 
ownership of the stock, except the right to sell or hypothecate 
the same ( Exh. I-P, Par. 3) . Since the Board of Directors, 
under the control of the Felts, could insist, and did insist on 
one of them being employed by the corporation, Fleming, in 
all probability, could not buy Felts' stock so long as they were 
living. 
The court, in stating that it would take Fleming about 
24 years to pay for the stock in Finding No. 4, was obviously 
figuring it at $200.00 per month. However, the point the court 
was emphasizing was that ownership and voting rights of the 
stock would remain with the Felts until the complete purchase 
price was paid and that is what the balance of Finding No. 4 
states (R. 271), thus giving the Felts complete control over 
Fleming until the last dollar was paid. 
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Defendants' argue in their brief that even though the Felts 
were hired by the company, Fleming could make payments on 
the purchase price and that the court has misinterpreted the 
contract in this respect. Counsel for defendants argued at the 
trial that the tender of $200.00 on the purchase price was 
premature because Fleming could not make payments on the 
purchase price until the Felts were no longer employed by 
the corporation. The court apparently believed that the indi-
vidual drafting the document would be in the best position 
to know what was intended by the language of the contract 
and, ,therefore, adopted the interpretation placed upon it by 
counsel for the defendants. As long as the Felts received the 
same salary as Fleming, he would hardly be in a position to 
make any payments on the purchase price, and the fact that 
defendants refused plaintiff's tender of $200.00 and $5,000.00 
in June and July of 1955 (R. 75, 109) is a good indication that 
payments could not be made while the Felts were employed 
by the company. If payments could be made while the Felts 
were still employed, then, the contract was breached by the 
Felts' refusal of the tenders. 
At most, plaintiff only had the right to purchase the Felts' 
stock at some extreme! y indefinite date in the future after he 
had paid the Felts $400.00 per month until their death and 
during a period when both of them should have been in re-
tirement. 
The contract also contained a very harsh and inequitable 
forfeiture provision to the effect that if Fleming failed to make 
any payments under the contract, the Felts could terminate 
the contract and Fleming would forfeit all that had been paid, 
namely, $13,512.00, plus any additional payments. 
13 
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Defendants claim the court used contradictory language 
in Finding No. 6 (R. 271, 272). They, however, only quoted 
1 
. .::. 
a portion of it in their brief. Reading the finding in its entirety 
it becomes evident that in the court's opinion, the only thing 
that Fleming could get out of the contract was the right to 
be general manager, which was worthless since, as stated in 
the balance of the finding, ·'The Board of Directors would 
. 
always be under the control of the Felts," and they could, 
therefore, ultimately control the general manager and make 
Fleming their puppet. 
The unfairness of the contract is a factor from which 
fraud can be inferred, especially when taken along with the 
false representations made to induce the contract, as set forth 
in 24 Am. Jur. Page 93, 94, Section 260, as follows: 
·'The fact that one in whom confidence is reposed by 
another obtains an apparent advantage over the latter 
in the transaction between them is a motivating factor 
in raising the presumption of fraud on the part of a 
fiduciary. Moreover, the unfairness of a transaction 
or the inadequacy of consideration is in itself a factor 
from which fraud can be inferred and such inference 
will operate along with other evidence to support a 
finding of fraud. . . . There may be contracts so ex-
tortionate and unconscionable on their face as to raise 
the presumption of fraud in their inception, or, at 
least, to require only a slight additional evidence to 
justify such a presumption. A presumption of fraud 
may also arise from unusual provisions in an instrument, 
whereby the draftsman of the instrument has obtained 
an advantage over the other party, or from a great 
deficiency in the quantity of real or personal property 
sold or from the failure of a party charged with fraud 
to appear and explain or to introduce testimony." 
14 
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Even if fraud had not been pleaded the illegality could be 
considered by the court as set forth in the following citation: 
"Were the matter showing the illegality of an agree-
ment appearing on the face of the pleading counting 
on it, its illegality is a question to be dealt with by 
the trial court without formal plea of facts showing 
its illegality. If plaintiff, in order to make out his cause 
of action, is required to show that the agreement sued 
upon is for any reason illegal the court should not en-
force it regardless of whether the illegality has been 
pleaded." 12 Am. Jur., Page 742, Section 223. See also 
to the same effect Kennedy vs. Lonabaugh (Wyo.) 
117 P. 1079. 
The contract was unilateral, namely one-sided; extremely 
unfair, founded in fraud, inequitable and illegal. 
POINT NO. II 
THE FINDING OF FACT NO. 8 IS REASONABLY 
SUSTAINED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Appellants cite numerous authorities to the effect that 
fraud as a general rule must relate to a present or pre-existing 
fact and they claim that the representations made by Mr. and 
Mrs. Felt are representations of an intention or expectation. 
A generally recognized rule of law is that a man's intent or 
state of mind is a fact which may be proved, and if shown to 
be falsely represented may form a foundation for actionable 
fraud. 
Hull vs. Flinders, 83 Utah 158, 27 P2d 56, quotes with 
approval from Ruling Case Laws, as follows: 
15 
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· · ... the intention to deceive is a condition of mind, 
which, when it exists, is as much a fact as a condition 
of the body, notwithstanding that it is more difficult 
to prove; . . . therefore, a misstatement of a man's 
mind is a misstatement of fact." See also to the same 
effect State vs. Bruce (Utah) 262 P2d 962. 
The following citations from American Jurisprudence are 
to the same effect: 
"The weight of authority holds that if the falsity of 
the statement can be established, a misrepresentation 
of intent is an actionable representation of fact. A 
statement by a speaker as to what he intends to do 
may import a statement of fact, that is, as to his present 
intention; and if his expressed intention is merely 
feigned in order to mislead, a charge of fraud may be 
predicated thereon ... fraud may in the majority of 
jurisdictions, be predicated on the non-performance 
of a promise in certain cases where the promise is the 
device to accomplish the fraud, the most frequent 
example of such a fraudulent promise being a promise 
made without any intention of performing it at the 
time of making it, or where a relation of trust and 
confidence exists between the parties. If through in-
ducements held out by one person even by means of 
a promise alone, another is influenced to change his 
position so that he cannot be placed in statu quo and 
will be seriously damaged unless the promise is ful-
filled, the refusal to perform has frequently been held 
to constitute fraud." 23 Am. Jur. Page 804-806, Sec. 
41, citing Hull vs. Flinders (Utah), 27 P2d 56. See 
also to the same effect Kritzer vs. Moffet (Wash.) 240 
p 355. 
"A majority of American courts hold that fraud 
may be predicated on promises made with a present 
intention not to perform them or as the rule is fre-
quently expressed on promises made without an in-
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tention of performance, and that for such fraudulent 
promise, relief may be had in equity or law, as the 
circumstances and issues presented demand. Recourse 
may therefore be had for such promise, made for the 
purpose of deceiving the promisee and inducing him 
to act where otherwise he would not do so, in such a 
way as to affect his legal right or to alter his position 
to his injury or risk, as by making and entering into 
disadvantageous contracts or in some way giving over, 
transferring, or surrendering real or personal property 
or rights therein to the person who makes the fraudu-
lent promise." 23 Am. Jur. Page 885, Section 106, 
citing Hull vs. Flinders (Utah) 27 P2d 56. 
Where parties are on unequal footing or confidential rela-
tionship exists, as in the instant case, the ordinary rules with 
respect to inability to predicate fraud on promises or statements 
with regards to future events have been somewhat modified 
as shown by the following: 
·'Where the parties to a transaction are not on an 
equal footing, but one of them has, or is in a position 
where he should have superior and accurate knowledge 
concerning the matters to which his statements relate, 
or the parties occupy a trust or confidential relation-
ship, the ordinary rules with respect to inability to 
predicate fraud on promises or statements with regard 
to future events have been somewhat modified. Thus, 
it has been held that where the parties do not stand 
on an equal footing, but one of them is in a position 
where he relies and is justified on relying on the other's 
opinion, the rule that representations made during the 
negotiations of a contract which are not statements of 
existing fact but prophesies of things to come, do not 
constitute actionable representations, is inapplicable, 
that the rule that a forecast of what will happen in the 
future is merely promissory, and not a statement of 
existing fact, does not apply, where the matter involved 
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is peculiarly within the speaker's knowledge." 51 
A.L.R. 81. 
A confidential relationship as above set forth applies to 
persons jointly entering into a business enterprise and is not 
limited to relations held fiduciary as a matter of law, as set 
forth in 37 C.J.S. Page 282, Section 35, as follows: 
"The same principles are applicable to persons jointly 
entering into a business enterprise, such as joint pur-
chasers, who are liable for inducing their co-purchasers 
to pay more than a fair share by misrepresenting the 
purchase price or the original cost, or persons asso-
ciated in business as partners, or officers, directors, 
and stockholders of the same corporation." 
The following citations set forth the method of proving 
an intent not to perform the promises or statements at the time 
they were made: 
"The correct rule, however, appears to be that, while 
the mere fact of failure or refusal to perform an oral 
agreement is not sufficient of itself to raise the issue 
of fraud, yet it is entitled to consideration for this pur-
pose along with such other relevant facts and circum-
stances as may be shown and the weight to be attached 
to the subsequent conduct of the promisor in failing 
or refusing to perform the promise would appear to 
depend on the particular circumstances, such failure 
or refusal being under some conditions strong evidence 
of an intent not to perform the promise at the time it 
was made, as, where the time which elapses between 
the making of the promise and the refusal ·to perform 
it is inconsequential and there is no change in circum-
stances, or the promisor does not make even a pretense 
of performance .... a person's intent within the mean-
ing of the rule relating to fraudulent promises made 
without intention of performance, is often a difficult 
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matter to determine, and evidence of subsequent con-
duct and speech on the part of the promisor may be 
resorted to for the purpose of showing fraudulent in-
tent, which may be shown by such evidence as matter 
of inference, although there is no direct evidence of 
a pre-conceived, secret intention on the part of the 
promisor at the time of making the promise not to be 
performed." 51 A.L.R. 164. 
"The view has been taken that the jury may find that 
the promisor, at the time he made the promise, had 
no intention of performance, so as to establish fraud, 
from the fact that thereafter the promisor did not even 
make a pretense of complying with the contract. 
Chicago T. & M.C.R. Co. vs. Titterington (Tex.) 19 
s.w. 472. 
"It is not essential that direct evidence of fraud be 
adduced; circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to 
establish it, and fraud may be proved by evidence wholly 
circumstantial, or by a combination of direct and cir-
cumstantial evidence, and where in the fact of in-
ferences so strong as to make out a prima facia case 
of fraud defendant remains silent, plaintiff should 
recover." 3 7 C.J.S. Page 436, Sec. 115. 
"And it has been held that if one asserts as a fact 
that he is about to do something, and thereby induces 
another to enter into contractual relations with him 
and such other party will be injured by the non-perform-
ance of the representations, the representor cannot 
avoid cancellation of the contract on the ground that 
the representations were mere matters of opinion; and 
even an actual fraudulent intent does not appear to be 
essential under this view, but may, it seems, be inferred 
or conclusively presumed." 51 A.L.R. 69. 
"Equity courts will act on circumstances, as pre-
sumptions of fraud, where courts of law would not 
deem them satisfactory proof. A transaction may be in-
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trinsically so unconscionable as in the absence of expla-
nation to furnish its own intrinsic proof of fraud. It 
has been said that the jurisdiction of courts of equity 
to relieve against active and effective fraud is so essen-
tial to the administration of justice therein that such 
courts will often, indeed, take hold of a twig or twine-
thread to up-hold it." 19 Am Jur. Page 67, Sec. 43. See 
also to the same effect Sullivan vs. Murphy (Iowa), 232 
N.W. 267. Emphasis supplied in foregoing citations. 
In view of the above authorities let us consider the evidence 
showing the falsity or intent to deceive on the part of J. H. 
Felt and Marie Felt. 
The knowledge of whether Mr. and Mrs. Felt would 
retire and give Fleming the full management of the business 
and whether Felt's position as president was honorary, were 
exclusively within the Felts' knowledge. 
There is no question but what Mr. and Mrs. Felt made 
the representations alleged and testified to by Fleming as they 
are not contradicted. 1 r~ 
In the middle of July, Mr. Felt told Fleming he could 
buy the business for $17,000.00 or $18,000.00 (R. 57); that 
Fleming would be general manager and have the full manage-
ment of the business (R. 59). Six weeks later after Fleming 
had moved from Provo, put his merchandise in the new cor-
poration, the contract prepared by defendants' attorney was 
presented to Fleming (R. 61, 62), and under its terms the 
price of Felts' business had been nearly doubled (Exh. 1-P). 
The new corporation was set up with J. H. Felt as president 
and Marie Felt as secretary and treasurer (Exh. 1-P), and the 1 ~~~ 
Felts with the majority on the Board of Directors, giving 
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them the control of the corportion (Exh. 15-D); which gives 
the inference, because of the short lapse of time after Felt 
made the representations, that Mr. Felt never had any intention 
to retire or sell his business for $17,000.00 or $18,000.00. No 
provision was put in the contract about the Felts' retirement, 
giving the inference that their expressed intention of retirement 
was false. Mr. Felt also made the statement at the Board of 
Directors meeting April 1, 1955, that the contract was not 
valid because it wasn't accepted (R. 64). He was obviously 
referring to the resolution of the Board of Directors on No-
vember 6, 1953, which authorized the new Fleming-Felt Com-
pany to enter into a contract with Fleming and to permit 
Fleming to act as ge_neral manager only so long as he did not 
show a loss, contrary to the contract which requires him not to 
show a loss in two consecutive years (Exh. 15-D, Page 3). 
At the time the contract was signed, approximately three 
months after Fleming moved his business from Provo, Mrs. 
Felt stated she would retire when Mr. Felt did (R. 61), which 
was never contradicted by Mrs. Felt. 
Mr. Felt at the time the contract was signed (R. 67) 
represented that his position as president was only honorary 
(R. 59) which was a statement of an existing fact. Mr. Felt 
also stated again at the signing of the contract that Fleming 
would have full management of the business (R. 59). 
As soon as Fleming tried to assert his office as general 
manager he was opposed by the Felts (R. 68, 69). In January 
of 1955, Mr. Fleming was discharged as general manager on 
the pretense that the company was losing money (R. 70, 71). 
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The foregoing circumstances raise the inference that the 
Felts never intended at anytime to release the actual control 
or management of the new company, although the Felts had 
let Fleming assume the mere title of general manager. The 
inference seems clear that Mr. Felt wanted a salesman, not a 
general manager. 
Fleming posted a notice of his duties as general manager; 
Mr. Felt ripped it down (R. 71). On May 23, 1955, the Felts, 
with the control of the Board of Directors, passed by-laws trans-
ferring the office of general manager to the president of the 
company, J. H. Felt (R. 71, Exh. P-2). Fleming fired Mrs. 
Felt and the Board of Directors rehired her (R. 74, 75, Exh. 
15-D). Plaintiff's tenders to buy the business from the Felts 
were refused (R. 75) and the Felts refused to rescind the 
contract (R. 107, 129). These circumstances show that the 
statements and promises were unfulfilled and the contract 
breached in every material aspect by the Felts and there was no 
pretense or intent of performance by the Felts. As indicated 
above, all the Felts wanted was a salesman who would buy the 
Felts' shares of stock in the Fleming-Felt Company, upon their 
death or at some future time at the option of J. H. Felt and 
Marie Felt or the survivor. 
In view of the foregoing circumstances it is reasonable 
to infer that the representations of the Felts were false when 
made with no intent of performance. 
Concerning the question of when Mr. Felt would retire, 
i.e., when Fleming became acquainted with the business, it 
would be expected that Felt would retire within a reasonable 
time and since Fleming had been engaged in the automotive 
22 
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parts business since 1949, that time could not reasonably be 
expected to be more than 8 or 9 months at the most. Felt also 
stated in July of 1953 he had come to the point he wanted to 
retire (R. 58), thus indicating it would be soon. 
The falsity of the representations as to Fleming being 
general manager, Mr. Felt's position as president being hon-
orary, and as to the Felts' retirement, were within the exclusive 
knowledge of the Felts, and plaintiff certainly had a right to 
rely on them, since by no means of investigation could Fleming 
determine they were false when made. Fleming testified that 
he did in good faith rely on the representations made by the 
Felts (R. 62, 66). 
Fleming testified he never had any previous experience 
in corporations prior to this deal, i.e. September 1, 1953 (R. 
64). He, therefore, would not understand the ultimate control 
of the Board of Directors and the disadvantageous position 
he was being placed in, and because of the confidential relation-
ship between the parties he would have a right to rely on the 
Felts' statements. 
When a confidential relationship exists between the parties 
representee has a right to rely. See 23 Am. Jur. Page 966, 
Sec. 159. 
Plaintiff was not relying on any one allegation any more 
than any other as a basis for his cause of action, such statements 
are unfounded suppositions of appellants. 
In Benson vs. Hamilton, (Cal. 1932) 14 P2d 876, it was 
held that in an action predicted on fraud consisting in a prom-
ise made without intention to perform, the essence of the fraud 
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is the existence of an intent at the time the promise was made 
not to perform it, and under this view the existence of such 
intent is always a question of fact, a finding on which, upon 
conflicting evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal. 
POINT NO. III 
FLEMING WAS NOT BARRED ON THE GROUNDS 
OF LACHES, WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL FROM SEEKING 
A RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT. 
Lapse of time alone does not constitute laches: 
"If prejudice will not be occasioned to the defendant 
as a result of the assertion of the complainant's right, 
laches is not predicable of delay attending the com-
mencement of the suit. There is no basis for a conten-
tion that the complainant has been guilty of laches 
where the rights of third persons are not involved and 
the situation of the defendant has not been materially 
changed by reason of the complainant's delay in assert-
ing his rights." 19 Am. Jur. Page 353, Sec. 509. 
The above rule is followed in Utah and is stated as follows 
in Mawhinney vs. Jensen, (Utah 1951) 232 P2d 769: 
''The equitable doctrine of laches is founded upon 
considerations of time and injury. Laches in legal sig-
nificance is not mere delay but delay that works a dis-
advantage to another." Pomeroy's Equity Jurispru-
dence, 4th Edition, Sec. 1442; Chase vs. Chase, 20 R.I. 
202, 3 7 A. 804. 
There have been no intervening rights of third parties 
in the present case and no injury or detriment to the defendants 
since discovery of the fraud. 
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The elements of an estoppel as related to the party claim-
ing the estoppel are as follows: 
( 1) "Lack of knowledge and of the means of 
knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; 
(2) Reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped; 
and 
( 3) Action based thereon of such a character as to 
change his position prejudicially." 19 Am. Jur. Page 
643, Sec. 42. 
The following authorities are to the same effect: 
"Estoppel rests largley upon injury or prejudice to 
the rights of him who asserts it. Since the function and 
purpose of the doctrine are the prevention of fraud 
and injustice, there can be no estoppel where there is 
no loss, injury, damage, or prejudice to the party claim-
ing it. Moreover, the injury or prejudice involved must 
be actual and substantial and not merely technical or 
formal." 19 Am. Jur. Page 735, Sec. 85. 
"The doctrine of estoppel had no application; the 
defendant was not induced to do anything to his harm 
by the words or conduct of the plaintiff. Doujotos vs. 
Leventhal (Mass.) 171 N.E. 445. 
Register tJS. Carmichael (Ala.), 53 So. 800, was cited with 
approval in Utah Bond and Share Co. vs. Chappel (Utah) 251 
P. 354 at Page 358, as follows: 
"The party against whom the estoppel is pleaded must 
have received some benefit under the election." 
Waiver is defined as follows: 
"A waiver is a voluntary and intentional abandon-
ment or relinquishment of known right. Unless it is 
under seal or arises from conduct creating an estoppel, 
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it must be supported by an agreement founded upon a 
valid consideration." 19 Am. Jur. Page 636, Sec. 36. 
Appellants claim that Fleming, by his conduct to assert 
his prerogatives as general manager, continuing to dra·v1 his 
salary and demanding his rights to purchase the Felt stock 
up to June 8, 1955, had waived any cause for rescission up to 
that time. 
Respondent submits that Fleming was never successful in 
asserting his prerogatives as general manager. When he tried 
to make changes for the good of the company, he was opposed 
(R. 68-71). For trying to assert his rights under the contract 
his office as general manager was transferred to the president, 
Joseph H. Felt (R. 71, Exh. P-2). 
Appellants never relied upon the conduct of Fleming or 
changed their position prejudicially. They nullified any attempt 
on the part of Fleming to assert his rights, and denied him the 
benefit of being general manager. 
Likewise, Fleming's tenders to purchase the Felts' stock 
were refused and appellants didn't rely upon or change their 
position because of Fleming's tenders (R. 75, 109). Neither 
did Fleming materially benefit in attempting to assert his 
rights under the contract. 
As to receiving his salary for his services, he cannot be 
held to be estopped, as shown by the following citations: 
"There are a number of limitations under the general 
rule of estoppel by the acceptance of benefits, and the 
mere fact that something more or less beneficial has 
come to a person as a direct or indirect result of some 
contract, statute, or transaction does not necessarily 
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always create an estoppel against him. As indicated in 
the preceding section, estoppel does not ordinarily 
arise from the acceptance of benefits where such ac-
ceptance is induced by excuseable ignorance or mistake 
as to the facts involved or where the acceptance is not 
inconsistent with the position subsequently taken. One 
cannot be estopped by reason of accepting that which 
he is legally entitled to receive in any event." 19 Am. 
Jur. Page 690, Sec. 65. 
"Where money is paid or services are rendered under 
a contract which is merely unenforceable, as in cases 
under the statute of frauds, an implied assumpsit lies 
for the money paid or the value of the services ren-
dered." 12 Am. Jur., 724, Sec. 213. 
"As a general proposition, it is no doubt true that 
the defense of illegality available to a party cannot 
be waived. The doctrine of estoppel by conduct or by 
laches has no applicaton to an agreement or instru-
ment which is illegal because it violates an express 
mandate of the law or the dictates of public policy. 
Neither action or inaction of a party to such an agree-
ment can validate it; and no conduct of a party to 
it can be invoked as an estoppel against asserting its 
invalidity. Neither party to an agreement against pub-
lic policy is estopped from questioning it because the 
other has parted with property or rendered services 
in reliance upon it, although there is some authority 
to the contrary." 12 Am. Jur. Page 741, Sec. 222. See 
also to the same effect Standard Furniture Co. vs. Van 
Alsteen (Wash.) 62 P. 145. 
Certainly respondent is legally entitled to compensation 
for his services and is entitled to it even though the contract 
is invalid. In addition, the appellants have received the same 
salary and benefits as Fleming. His salary is not something that 
should be returned on rescission of the contract or something 
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he is receiving for no value, and, therefore, does not prevent 
rescission. 
The case of Frailey vs. McGarry, 116 (Utah) 504, 211 
P2d 840 ( 1949), which appellants claim has parallel facts to 
the instant case, is distinguishable. In the Frailey case the falsity 
of the statements were made known to the defendant many 
months before he decided to rescind the contract. 
In the instant case Fleming in February or March of 1955, 
as soon as he had any indication that he could not assert his 
rights as general manager and that he had been charged with 
obsolete merchandise, offered to leave the business, provided 
he got his merchandise out of the company; thus announcing 
his intention to rescind (R. 73, 74, 78, 79). Mr. Felt decided to 
leave instead (R. 73, 74), thus creating the impression that 
the contract might be performed at least in the aspect of 
Fleming being the general manager. Mr. Felt also promised to 
reduce the price of his stock on the J. H. Felt Motor Supply 
Company inventory following the payment of all but $1,000.00 
as a result of settlement negotiations (R. 80) . The Board of 
Directors rehired Marie Felt as secretary-treasurer and trans-
ferred the duties of general manager to J. H. Felt shortly 
thereafter, thus showing there was a false impression of per-
formance previously given by the Felts (R. 71, 74, 75, Exh. 
P-2, Art 3, Par. 2). This action was taken on May 23, 1955, 
and on June 1 and 8 of 1955, plaintiff's tenders to purchase 
the Felts' interest were refused. Plaintiff announced he was 
leaving the business (R. 75, 76) and appellants again at that 
time requested a meeting to talk settlement (R. 76). There-
after, plaintiff offered $5,000.00 on the purchase price which 
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appellants didn't accept, and on July 26, 1955, plaintiff tendered 
defendants' stock and requested a rescission of the contract 
and filed suit for rescission. 
As previously argued, none of these attempts by Fleming to 
assert his rights caused the defendants to change their position 
to their detriment or give the plaintiff any benefit he was not 
legally entitled to. 
Fleming became fully aware of the fraud, on or about 
June 8, 1955. 
"Unsuccessful negotiations looking toward perform-
ance can hardly be considered inconsistent with a con-
tinuing right of rescission, and if a seller induces a 
buyer to retain defective goods for a further trial, a 
prompt manifestation of election after such further 
trial is sufficient. Where promptness of rescission is 
required, it would seem the facts of each case should 
be considered by the jury to determine whether there 
has been unreasonable delay." Wiliston on Contracts, 
Page 4111, Sec. 1469. 
From February, 1955, to July 26, 1955, negotiations for 
settlement were attempted in the instant case (R. 76, 79, 80, 
109, Exh. 15-D, Page 8), and are cause for extending delay 
in rescinding. 
In the Frailey case there was a prior breach by the plaintiff 
in failing to pay the taxes, and there is no prior breach on the 
part of the plaintiff in the instant case. When Frailey finally 
decided to rescind he still maintained the right to retain the 
benefits under the contract, i.e., the water rights. Fleming 
tendered everything he received under the contract except his 
salary earned which he was legally entitled to. The Frailey case 
also stands for the following proposition at Page 845: 
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"As I understand the prevailing opinion, it is not in 
any way contrary to this view that considerable time 
might be accorded to exercise an election to rescind in 
cases such as this where the grounds of rescission may 
not be so clear and where the election may depend 
upon reducing to a reasonable certainty some of the con-
tingencies which may be in the path of rescission." 
When Fleming's grounds for rescission became clear, he 
announced the decision and adhered to it. 
In the LeVine vs. Whitehouse, 3 7 (Utah) 260, 109 P. 2, 
cited by appellants, Whitehouse continued to accept payments 
on the contract for 11 months after they became fully aware 
of the fraud. 
After Fleming became sure of his grounds for rescission 
in June of 1955, he never accepted any further salary which 
he was legally entitled to up until that time. 
Defendants claim by Exh. 12-P that the business was losing 
money. Mr. Owen Sumsion, a certified public accountant, stated 
that $2,800.00 for obsolete items was taken out of the ending 
inventory of February 28, 195 5 (R. 188), and that it was an 
estimated inventory not based upon verification (R. 191). The 
balance sheet (Exh. 12-P) was simply based upon arbitrary 
computations and are not competent evidences to show a loss 
( R. 131, 19 5), and counsel for defendants so stated (R. 195). 
As to the time the duties of general manager were posted 
by Fleming in the company's offices, Fleming denied that he 
said, "I am the most surprised man in the world. I thought you 
I ]f'i 
folks would blow up and fire me as general manager. Then I 1 ~ : 
was going to sue you for breach of contract" (R. 262). On 
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cross-examination Mrs. Felt reversed her testimony in this re-
spect, as is shown by the following excerpts from her testimony: 
Q. "Now can you tell me that actually Mr. Fleming 
at that time said that 'I expected you to sue me for 
breach of contract for putting that thing up there.' Can 
you look me in the eye and say he actually said that?" 
(R. 238). 
A. "I certainly can; that is exactly what he said the 
night that-the night of the day it was posted.'' (R. 
238). 
Certainly the tender of $200.00 on June 8, 195 5, was 
refused unequivocally. The $200.00 check on the first of June 
was sent back with no explanation whatsoever (R. 75). Con-
sistent therewith, 8 days later, after appellants had plenty of 
time to consult with their attorney concerning the first tender, 
they refused the tender of $200.00 cash (R. 75). Russell 
Weaver testified as follows: 
Q. "What did Mr. Felt say when he tendered that 
money?" 
A. "He just refused it.'' 
J. " ... Would you state just what Mr. Felt said, 
Mr. Weaver.'' 
A. "As I remember his words, he said: 'I cannot 
take that; I cannot take it.' " (R. 184). 
Fleming's testimony was that there was an out-right refusal 
of the money and not until he returned the keys and the cash 
of the corporation and announced he was leaving the business 
did Felt request that he go with him to see an attorney (R. 75, 
76). 
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Since it was contended at the trial by the appellants that 
no payment could be made on the Felts' stock as long as either · :-: 
of the Felts was hired by the corporation and the tenders 
were premature, we can assume that there was an unequivocal 
refusal under this view of the contract. 
Defendants claim that a mere refusal of $200.00 payment 
would not warrant rescission. However, we have more than 
that. Anything under a $10,000.00 payment was unacceptable 
to the Felts, and Mr. Felt refused a $5,000.00 payment on the ··· 
purchase price (R. 109, 110). Defendants had already refused 
to perform on the only other material aspect of the contract, 
i.e., permitting Fleming to assert his rights as general manager. 
Therefore, we have a material breach and repudiation of the 
contract by defendants, which would justify a rescission. 
Defendants now set up estoppel and waiver, and yet the' 
did not plead waiver and estoppel or argue it at the trial. 
These are affirmative defenses which must be pleaded under 
Rule 8 (c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 195 3, or they are 
waived. 
Fleming should not be denied the rescission of the contract 
on the grounds of waiver, laches and estoppel. 
POINT NO. IV 
FINDINGS OF FACT NOS. 7 AND 11 ARE REA· 
SONABLY SUSTAINED BY THE EVIDENCE AND LEND 
SUPPORT TO THE JUDGMENT OF RESCISSION. 
Defendants claim the Memorandum Decision deals ex· 
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elusively with the invalidity of the contract. This is not so, for 
on Page 3 it reads as follows: 
"Without, this memorandum, going into the other 
matters in the evidence, which confirm this same result, 
it follows that the contract between the Felts and Flem-
ing is wholly unilateral, inequitable and unenforce-
able by Fleming against the Felts and grants the Felts 
complete power to dominate and terminate the contract 
against Fleming." (R. 268). 
Defendants have ignored the vital part of the by-laws passed 
on May 23, 1955, and not on May 23, 1953, as set forth in 
defendants' brief. The by-law which takes the duty of the 
general manager from Fleming is Art. III, No. 2 (Exh. 2-P), 
as follows: 
"The president shall preside at all meetings of the 
directors and stockholders and shall have full charge 
of and control over the affairs of the corporation, subject 
to the Board of Directors.'' 
No. 3 of Article 3 is as follows: 
"The vice-president shall perform such duties as may 
be assigned to him by the Board of Directors. In case 
of death, disability or absence of the president, he 
shall perform and be vested with all of the duties and 
powers of the president." 
This is contrary to the contract, and the by-laws could just 
as easily have stated that the vice-president, who was Fleming, 
was to have the general management and control instead of 
the president. In view of the dispute between the parties at 
the time the by-laws were passed, this appears to have been an 
intentional transfer of the general management by the Board 
of Directors. 
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Article 3, No. 3, shows that the vice-president was not to 
become vested with the duties of the general management and 
control until the death of the president. 
The corporation laws of the State of Utah, Section 16-
2-21, do not require the president to have the general charge 
and control of the corporate affairs subject to the Board of 
Directors. It only requires that the "corporate powers of the 
corporation shall be exercised by the Board of Directors ... " 
The Felts' conduct, on May 23, 1955, the same day as the 
by-laws were passed, as Directors of the company, in passing 
a resolution rehiring Marie at $400.00 per month, was a direct 
interference with Fleming's management of the business, con-
trary to defendants' claim that there was no interference by 
the Felts pursuant to the by-laws. 
Mrs. Felt, in outlining the duties of a general manager, 
admitted Fleming had the authority as general manager to hire 
and fire (R. 232, 233). Yet, the Board of Directors stepped 
in and nullified this action which Fleming had taken to save 
the company money (R. 75). 
As to the resolution curtailing Fleming's authority to 
issue checks, prior to May 23, 1955, Fleming had been exercis-
ing this right alone, so in passing the resolution it showed the 
general pattern and intent of the Felts to strip Fleming of all 
authority. 
In view of the January, 1955, so-called Board of Directors 
meeting, when Fleming was reduced to sales manager (R. 71) 
and the Felts' interference with Fleming's attempts to assert 
his right as general manager (R. 68, 69), the passing of the 
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by-laws and resolution on May 23, 1955, was the final official 
act divesting Fleming of his title of general manager and any 
authority he may have had. 
In setting up a new checking account, Fleming's only desire 
was to be able to meet the obligations of the company in view 
of the difficulties he had with the Felts (R. 73). There was 
nothing dishonest about it. He did not anticipate using the funds 
for his own purpose and did not so use them. Mrs. Felt testi-
fied that she did not know when the check was taken (R. 223). 
She wished to infer that it was taken from the bottom of the 
check book so she would not know about it. However, on cross-
examination, she testified as follows: 
Q. "But he told you on the day he wrote the check 
that he had written it; is that correct?" 
A. "Yes, he did that night after hours." (R. 230). 
The check was drawn March 2, 1955, and returned to the 
regular account according to Mrs. Felt's testimony on the 
following day, March 3, 1955 (R. 231). 
If the Felts had been concerned about the honesty of 
Fleming they would not have waited until May 23, 1957, to 
curtail his check-writing authority. 
Appellants in their brief claim the changes proposed by 
Fleming were all carried out. This is not substantiated by the 
evidence. The only change really made of any substance at a 
later date was a change in the office furniture (R. 67, 68). 
As to Marie Felt's outline of the duties of general manager 
and appellants' claim that none of them were interfered with, 
she claimed that the general manager was responsible for 
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making a profit, filling orders, namely delivery service, the 
bookkeeping department (R. 221), and hiring and firing (R. 
232). It is obvious from the foregoing argument that these 
duties were interferred with as shown by the testimony, namely, 
on price cutting on old merchandise (R. 69), on bookkeeping 
(R. 68), rehiring Marie Felt after Fleming fired her to reduce 
costs (R. 74, 75, Exh. 15-D, Page 9). 
Although the duties of general maanger were not outlined, 
the contract infers a broad delegation of authority with only a 
reservation in the Board of Directors to step in when Fleming 
failed to make a profit for two consecutive years (Exh. 1-P, 
Paragraph 4). This would be in keeping with the Felts' 
representation when the contract was signed that Fleming was 
to have the management of the business. 
The whole object of the contract had been defeated when 
plaintiffs tenders were refused and as shown in Point No. 3, 
there was no waiver of fraud and certainly no waiver of the 
breach of May 23, 1955, and the breach of June 8, 1955, which 
support the Decree of Rescission. 
Findings of Fact Nos. 7 and 11 are supported by ample 
evidence and they do support the judgment for rescission. 
POINT NO. V 
I . . 
~· • 
,~: 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING A I 
MONEY JUDGMENT. 
The following authorities indicate that a money judgment 
is proper when property cannot be restored in specie: 
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"The right to resctsston and restitution generally 
exists as an alternative remedy to an action for damages 
where there has been a repudiation or a material breach 
of a contract and is most commonly exercised when 
the aggrieved party has performed fully or in part and 
wishes to recover what he has given or its value." 
Williston on Contracts, Section 1455. 
"In cases where acting in good faith, property has 
been so changed or lost that it cannot be restored in 
specie and where its value is capable of being ascer-
tained, a party entitled to do so may rescind a contract 
by tendering the pecuniary equivalent of the property 
in question. 12 Am. Jur. Page 1034, Section 452. 
It is evident that the original merchandise which Fleming 
contributed was not available for a return to him. Fleming's 
testimony was that his inventory had a fast turn-over and was 
sold within approximately 3 months (R. 132). That when he 
left the business on June 8, 1955, some of his merchandise 
that had been replaced could have been remaining, but he 
had no idea how much (R. 133). 
Two and one-half years have elapsed since that time and 
it was evident to the court that defendants could not restore 
what plaintiff contributed in specie and it was impracticable 
to decree a restoration of the property. Fleming was therefore 
entitled to the value of his contribution, namely $13,512.00, 
which was the valuation placed upon it at the time it was put 
into the Fleming-Felt Company, and said value was admitted 
in the contract (Exh. 1-P) and plaintiff testified as to its value 
of $13,511.52 (R. 62). This was the only equitable means of 
restoring the status quo. 
The business had not lost money. Exh. 12-P was based upon 
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an estimated inventory and was an arbitrary computation in-
competent to show a loss as testified to by Owen Sumsion and 
Fleming (R. 131, 191). Mr. Sumsion also testified that the 
company was paying its obligations (R. 193) and the accounts 
receivable were good accounts (R. 192). 
Plaintiff was legally entitled to his earnings of $400.00 
per month as previously argued. He couldn't be expected to 
work for nothing and give the Felts the entire benefit from 
his services. Fleming lost his business he built up in Provo, 
Utah, and has had the problem of trying to build a new auto-
motive parts business while his assets have been retained by 
the defendants for the past 2Yz years. To require a return of 
Fleming's salary would give defendants an unconscionable 
advantage and reward them for their wrongful conduct. 
To arrive at the inventory on June 8, 1955, the court would 
have had to indulge in conjecture and estimate; there was no 
proof of what it was. The proposed division of joint inventory 
by appellants as of June 8, 1955, would be inequitable since 
Fleming's uncontradicted testimony was that 80 per cent of 
the business was done with his merchandise and Mr. King 
testified that only 50 per cent of the inventory of J. H. Felt 
Motor Supply Co. was readily marketable on September 1, 
1953 (R. 133, 148). 
Interest was properly allowed in restoring the status quo fm~m 
as shown by the following citations: 
In the annotation of 171 ALR at page 854, which deals 
with the allowance of interest in actions for fraud, it clearly 
appears that the vast majority of American jurisdictions allow 
interest prior to judgment at the legal statutory rate ( 67c): 
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"The broad principle that when interest by way of 
damages is allowed, it is generally computed at the 
legal statutory rate, is applicable to the recovery of 
interest in actions based on fraud or duress. This con-
clusion is supported by the many decisions scattered 
throughout the annotation, in which the court approves 
the allowance of interest at a designated rate which, 
although it is not expressly so denominated, is from the 
context, clearly the statutory rate in the jurisdiction 
in question. It is also expressly supported in some in-
stances by the language used in the decision." 
In the case of Kimball vs. Salt Lake City, 32 (Utah) 253 
90 P. 395 at page 261 of its decision, the court stated: 
" ... We have had occasion to pass upon the subject 
of when interest is to be allowed on claims for un-
liquidated damages at this term in the case of Fell vs. 
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 88 P. 1003, and this case 
clearly falls within the principles announced within 
this case. In addition to the authorities there cited, the 
following support respondents contention that interest 
is to be allowed in this class of cases as a matter of legal 
right ... " 
In the case of Fell vs. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 32 Utah 
101 88 P. 1003, the court set forth the principles pertaining to 
the allowance of interest in cases like "the one at bar, although 
the case was not one involving fraud. However, it clearly in-
dicated that cases involving fraud should come within the scope 
of its ruling. 
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH Y. LARSEN, JR. 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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